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Abstract. In black-box testing of GUI applications (a form of system
testing), a dynamic analysis of the GUI application is used to infer a
black-box model; the black-box model is then used to derive test cases
for the test of the GUI application. In this paper, we propose to supple-
ment the test with the verification of the black-box model. We present a
method that can give a guarantee of the absence of faults, i.e., the cor-
rectness of all test cases of the black-box model. The black-model allows
us to formulate a parametrized verification problem. As we will show,
it also allows us to circumvent the static analysis of the GUI tool kit.
We have implemented our approach; preliminary experiments indicate
its practical potential.
1 Introduction and Overview
Many of today’s applications provide a GUI (Graphical User Interface) which
allows a user to interact with the system. A GUI consists of a set of widgets, e.g.,
buttons and check boxes. A user interacts with the system by manipulating these
widgets, e.g., clicking a button, or selecting a check box. Each user interaction
triggers an event. An event is a message generated by the GUI toolkit. A GUI
application responds to a message with the execution of an event handler (e.g.,
a Java method).
The GUI application must not be confused with the GUI toolkit. In the
fashion of an operating system, the GUI toolkit (through a message loop) con-
tinuously listens for events and, each time an event is triggered, initiates the
execution of the corresponding event handler.
Until now, the topic of GUI applications as a target of formal, static analysis-
based verification has received little attention (see, however, [7,12,14] for initial
attempts). It is generally agreed that a static analysis cannot adequately account
for the GUI toolkit (even its source code was fully available, which is generally
not the case). The GUI toolkit is, however, an integral part of a GUI application.
Without accounting for the GUI toolkit, it already seems impossible to infer what
event sequences are executable (an event sequence models a user interaction).
Not every event sequence is executable; for example, an event may lead to closing
a window and thus disable another event.
In contrast, testing of GUI applications (which is a form of system testing) has
become a very active research topic; see e.g., [1,15,16,17,4,21] and the references
therein. Within the setting of black-box system testing, a dynamic analysis of the
GUI application is used to infer a black-box model. Subsequently, the black-box
model is used to derive the test cases.
In this paper, we base ourselves on the notion of the Event Flow Graph
(EFG), which is the particular black-box model in the popular approach of [17].
The nodes in an EFG are events. Its edge translate the is-followed-by relation
between events. The EFG represents a set of event sequences (the labelings of
the paths in the graph).
The EFG can be inferred automatically. A so-called GUI Ripper systemati-
cally explores the space of possible executions of the GUI application and records
the is-followed-by relation between events during those executions through the
edges of the EFG. Note that the exploration can never be guaranteed to be
exhaustive (this is inherent to the black-box setting; an event can be missed,
for example). Thus, the EFG is not guaranteed to include every possible event
sequence of the GUI application.
In this paper, we take the view where the actual test of a GUI application is
separated from the construction of the EFG. I.e., the test refers to the previously
inferred EFG. The EFG serves to prescribe a set of potential test cases; i.e.,
the EFG defines an upper bound on the set of event sequences to be checked.
Continuing this view, the EFG defines a specific verification problem: does there
exist an event sequence in the given EFG that, if run on the GUI application,
leads to a faulty execution?1
The test of the GUI application with test cases derived from the given EFG
provides an incomplete solution for the verification problem (incomplete because
at no point, no matter how many test cases are derived from the EFG, the ab-
sence of faults can be guaranteed). In this paper, we present a complete solution
to the verification problem.
The motivation is to supplement testing. Testing is known to be indispensable
but it comes with the notorious deficiency of being incomplete. At some point
during the test-debug cycle, the tester may desire a formal guarantee of the
absence of faulty event sequences (in the set prescribed by the given EFG).
Given such a guarantee, the tester can stop testing: no test case derived from
the given EFG will yield to a positive.
As usual with an undecidable verification problem, the terminology complete
solution refers to an abstraction-based verification algorithm with or without
iterated abstraction refinement, i.e., with the possibility of non-termination or
with the possibility of a don’t know answer.
From the perspective of the programmer, a GUI application consists of the
family of event handlers but, as explained above, verification needs to also ac-
count for the effect of the GUI toolkit on the executability of event sequences.
Thus, a static analysis-based verification method seems a no-go. However, and
this is a basic observation put forward in this paper, at least some of the informa-
tion about the effect of the GUI toolkit on the executability of event sequences
1 The problem formulation (as well as our use of the term completeness) reflects the
perspective of testing, which is falsification rather than verification. However, we
view the problem as a verification problem.
is encoded in the EFG (simply by the fact that the EFG has been constructed
by executing the GUI application).
In this paper, we propose a way to make this information available. Moreover,
we can formally show that it is sufficient to solve our verification problem.
Given the EFG and the family of event handlers, one can construct a pro-
gram that contains the event handlers and a mock-up of the GUI toolkit (of its
message loop). The program mimicks the behavior of the GUI application as far
it is represented by the EFG. We can show that by applying a static analysis-
based verification method to the program, we obtain a complete solution for the
verification problem for the GUI application and the given EFG.
We will next discuss another issue, an issue that leads us to enhancing the
above verification method. That is, not every event sequence in the set rep-
resented by the EFG needs to be executable on the GUI application. This is
because, although an event may be executable after another one in one path,
this may no longer hold in another path (for an example, see Section 2). For-
malized in the framework of abstract interpretation [10], the construction of the
EFG uses an abstraction of the (finite) set of executed paths by a graph which
denotes a larger (infinite) set of paths.
The program that we have constructed as input for verification accounts for
the behavior of (the message loop of) the GUI toolkit according to the EFG. I.e.,
not every execution of the program may be executable on the GUI application.
As a consequence, if the verification of the program returns a counterexample
(a faulty execution of the program), then this counterexample may not be exe-
cutable on the GUI application. In our setting of abstraction-based verification,
we thus have two notions of spuriousness. The first spuriousness is due to the
abstraction used by the static analysis (the path may be infeasible because of
data dependencies). The second spuriousness is due to the use of a graph (i.e.,
the EFG) as a representation of a set of paths (the path may be not executable
because of the behavior of the GUI toolkit).
There is no way to detect the non-executability statically (other than by the
static analysis of the GUI toolkit). In the dynamic setting of testing, however, the
non-executability of an event sequence is detected by nature. Having introduced
a first heresy (by formally verifying a program that is inferred from a black-box
model), we may be as well introduce a second heresy and use dynamic analysis in
an abstraction refinement iteration. I.e., if the verification of the program detects
a counterexample (i.e., an execution of the program that violates the correctness
condition) and if the dynamic analysis determines the non-executability of the
counterexample by the GUI application, then, as we will shown, the program can
be refined so that the counterexample is no longer a possible execution of the new
program. We thus enhance the verification method with a program refinement
iteration.
Even without the program refinement iteration, the verification of the pro-
gram constructed from a given EFG provides a guarantee of the absence of faults:
no test case derivable from the EFG can lead to a faulty execution of the GUI
application. The enhanced verification method (with the program refinement it-
eration) satisfies also the no false positives requirement. I.e., if a counterexample
is returned then it indeed corresponds to an (“executable”) faulty execution, and
if the GUI application does not have a faulty execution, then the method will
not return a counterexample. This means that we can use our method not only
for verification but also for falsification, i.e., as an enhancement of testing (it
may find errors that testing might not find).
We have implemented our overall approach and we have evaluated it on a
number of existing benchmarks from GUI testing. Our preliminary experiments
indicate a promising potential of our method as supplement and enhancement
to testing.
2 Motivating Example
In this section we illustrate the application of our approach on an example of a
GUI application. The example application depicted in the screenshot in Figure 1
consists of a MainWindow and a Dialog. The MainWindow contains three buttons
that can fire the events e1, e2, and e3. The Dialog contains one button which
can fire event e4.
Fig. 1. An example of a GUI application. The arrows between the two screenshots
indicate the transition between two views: Clicking the button for event e3 leads to the
Dialog; i.e., the buttons for the events e1, e2, and e3 are no longer enabled. Clicking
the button for event e4 closes the Dialog and leads back to the first view; i.e., the
buttons for the events e1, e2, and e3 are enabled again.
In the first step of our approach we incorporate an Event Flow Graph (EFG)
in order to model possible user interactions of the GUI application. An EFG is a
directed graph where each node represents an event of the GUI. An edge between
two events states that the corresponding events can be executed consecutively.
The EFG of the example application depicted in Figure 2 consists of the four
events e1, e2, e3, and e4. Such a graph represents the black-box model that is
used to generate test cases in [17]. The idea is that a path in the EFG encodes
a sequence of user interactions. The marking of e1, e2, and e3 as initial nodes
encodes how a user interaction can start. In our approach we automatically
infer an EFG using reverse engineering [18]. Moreover, we apply our tool, called
Gazoo [1], in order to extract the event handlers of each event.
e1
e3
e2
e4
Fig. 2. Event Flow Graph for the example application. Each event can follow each other
event except that e4 can follow only after e3. A path in the EFG encodes a sequence
of user interactions. The marking of initial nodes encodes that a user interaction can
start with e1, e2, e3, but not e4.
The set of event handlers and the EFG serve as input for the translation
of the GUI application into a verifiable program. That is, we apply our tool,
called Joogie [2], in order to construct the program depicted in Figure 3 which
represents the event handlers and a mock-up of the message loop as far it is
represented by the EFG. The program starts with the block START which initial-
izes the used variables. Furthermore, the block START provides a goto statement
which allows the non-deterministic choice of the blocks e1, e2, and e3. The
blocks that can be chosen within the block START conform to the initial events
that can be chosen from the EFG. In this program, each event handler is encoded
as a set of blocks. For example, the event e1 is encoded in block e1, and event e2
is encoded in the blocks e2, e2 THEN, e2 ELSE, and e2 ENDIF. The last block of
each event handler contains a goto statement which allows a non-deterministic
choice of possible succeeding events according to the EFG. The block EXIT con-
tains a property, encoded as an assertion, which must hold after the execution
of each event handler (the goto statement in each event handlers provides the
possibility of choosing the block EXIT).
In the third step of our approach we apply a static analysis, calledKojak [13],
on the program constructed in the previous step. We inject different assertions
(that is, properties of the GUI application) and show the outcome of the static
analysis.
If we inject the assertion assert(x != 7), the static analysis outputs the
result UNSAFE, that is, a violation of this assertion is found in the program. In
particular, the static analysis outputs the shortest sequence of events which leads
to the violation, namely the event sequence e1 e2 e2 e2 e3 .
In order to validate whether this event sequence is actually executable, we
replay the event sequence on the GUI application using a replayer. That is,
1 procedure EFG_Procedure () modifies ...
2 {
3 INIT :
4 ...
5 START:
6 x := 0;
7 goto e1 , e2 , e3;
8
9 e1: // handler of event e1
10 x := 1;
11 goto e1 , e2 , e3 , EXIT ;
12
13 e2: // handler of event e2
14 x := x * 2;
15 goto e2_THEN , e2_ELSE;
16
17 e2_THEN :
18 assume (x > 4);
19 call e3$setEnabled (false); // disable event e3
20 goto e2_ENDIF ;
21
22 e2_ELSE :
23 assume (!(x > 4));
24 goto e2_ENDIF ;
25
26 e2_ENDIF :
27 goto e1 , e2 , e3 , EXIT ;
28
29 e3: // handler of event e3
30 x := x - 1;
31 call dialog$setVisible (true );
32 goto e4 , EXIT ;
33
34 e4: // handler of event e4
35 x := 1;
36 call dialog$setVisible (false);
37 goto e1 , e2 , e3 , EXIT ;
38
39 EXIT :
40 assert (x != 7); // assertion to be checked
41 return;
42 }
Fig. 3. A code snippet of the constructed (Boogie) program (of the EFG and the
extracted event handlers). The procedure EFG Procedure defines a set of blocks for the
event handlers e1, e2, e3, and e4. The event handler e1 assigns the constant value 1
to variable x (line 8). The event handler e2 multiplies the value of variable x with 2
(line 12). If the value of variable x is greater than 4, then the event handler e2 disables
the button which can fire the event e3 (line 17). The event handler e3 decrements
variable x and opens the dialog (line 28-29). The event handler e4 assigns the constant
value 1 to variable x and closes the dialog (line 33-34).
we apply the tool GUITAR [17], which takes as input a sequence of events to
mimmick user interactions in a black-fashion on the GUI application. The result
of the replayer states, whether the event sequence was successfully replayed or
not.
In the case of the assertion assert(x != 7), the event sequence e1 e2 e2 e2 e3
is not executable on the GUI. The reason is that the last event e2 in the event
sequence disables the event e3 (which refers to line 17) in Figure 3. The fact
that the event sequence is not executable causes our approach to automatically
refine the used EFG.
The refinement step of our approach modifies the EFG, such that the de-
tected non-executable event sequence (encoded as a path in the graph) is not
contained in a refined EFG. In order to achieve this goal, we first convert both
the EFG and the non-executable event sequence into automata, which allows
us to apply operations from regular languages on these automata. In particular,
the non-executable event sequence is encoded as an accepting word of the EFG
automaton. We construct the complement of the accepting word and intersect
it with the EFG automaton. The result is a refined EFG automaton which does
not accept the non-executable event sequence. Finally, we convert the refined
EFG automaton back into an EFG, which we call Extended EFG as depicted in
Figure 4.
The extended EFG is now used to construct a new program. The static anal-
ysis is again applied to verify whether the assertion assert(x != 7) is violated.
In this case, the output of the static analysis is SAFE, since there exist no sequence
of events in the program which leads to the violation of the property.
e1
e3
e2e2e2e2
e4
Fig. 4. Extended Event Flow Graph for the example GUI. Comparing to the original
EFG, the event sequence e1, e2, e2, e2, e3 is no longer possible.
For completeness we inject one further assertion: For the property assert(x
!= 3), the static analysis outputs the result UNSAFE and the event sequence
e1 e2 e2 e3 which leads to the violating state. Unlike our first example, this
event sequence is indeed executable on the GUI application without a further
iteration of the refinement loop.
3 Approach
The runtime behavior of event-driven applications is determined by the occur-
rence of events. In our context, events can be triggered by the user interacting
with the graphical user interface of the application. The GUI restricts the events
that may be executed at any given time by, for example, enabling and disabling
controls or displaying modal dialog boxes. An event flow graph effectively en-
codes those restrictions.
The goal of a tester is to determine whether, among the set of event sequences
encoded by the event flow graph, all those that are executable in the application
satisfy a property of interest. That is, whether they are correct. It is evident
that testing cannot efficiently provide a guarantee that all test sequences are
correct. We thus propose to encode the set of sequences represented by the
EFG as a program, which traces correspond to event sequences of the EFG.
The program can then be statically analyzed to efficiently determine whether all
traces are correct, from which we can deduce that all sequences of the EFG are
also correct. If a violating sequence is found, we use a replayer to dynamically
check whether the sequence found is an executable one. In order to automate
the process, a non-executable event sequence triggers a refinement loop where
the EFG is modified to exclude all event sequences that start with the one found
by the static analyzer.
The verification algorithm (see Algorithm 1) of our approach takes as input
a system S and an event flow graph E. The system S contains the GUI ap-
plication to be tested (including the properties to be checked), the underlying
GUI toolkit, the operating system, etc. The EFG E can be created manually or
automatically [18]. The algorithm starts with the extraction of the set of event
handlers using the system S and the EFG E; see line 2 and Section 3.1. Then,
the algorithm constructs a program PEFG which represents a mock-up of the
message loop by employing the set of event handlers H and the EFG E; see
line 4 and Section 3.2. In line 5, a static analysis is applied which returns a
sequence of events σ; see Section 3.3. If the event sequence σ is empty, then the
static analysis did not find a violation of a property, and success is returned
from the verification algorithm (line 14). In contrast, if the event sequence σ
is not empty, then the static analysis found an event sequence which violates
a property. Thus, the violating event sequence σ is replayed on the system S;
see line 7, Section 3.4. The replayer returns a boolean flag indicating the exe-
cutability of the sequence, and the non-executable prefix σI of the sequence σ.
If σ was executable, the verification algorithm returns fail (line 11). If σ was
not executable, the non-executable prefix σI of the event sequence σ is removed
from the EFG; see line 9 and Section 3.5. The result of the refinement is an
extended EFG, which is used to construct a new program PEFG.
We start by formalizing the problem of verification of GUI applications. We
then describe the details of the steps involved in our proposed algorithm.
Extended Flow Graphs In the literature [17], an event flow graph is defined
as a directed graph G = 〈E, I, δ〉 where E is the set of events, I ⊆ E is the set
Algorithm 1: Verification Algorithm.
Input: S : System, E : EFG
Output: (fail, σ) or (success, null) (σ is null or an event sequence in E)
1 begin
2 H := ExtractEventHandlers(S, E)
3 while true do
4 PEFG := BuildMessageLoop(H , E)
5 σ := RunStaticAnalysis(PEFG)
6 if σ 6= null then
7 (IsExec, σI) := ReplaySequence(S, σ)
8 if IsExec = false then
9 E := RefineEFG(E, σI)
10 else
11 return (fail, σ)
12 end if
13 else
14 return (success, null)
15 end if
16 end while
17 end
of initial events and δ ⊆ E × E is the event flow relation. An edge (e, e′) ∈ δ
between two events e, e′ ∈ E states that the event e′ can be executed after the
event e. If there is no edge between events e, e′ then event e′ cannot be executed
after event e.
In order to support our refinement approach, we extend the classical defini-
tion of event flow graphs to enable having multiple nodes labeled with the same
event.
Definition 1 (Extended Event Flow Graph). An extended event flow graph
is a labeled, directed graph F = 〈L,L0, δ, Γ 〉 where L is the set of locations, L0
the set of initial locations, δ ⊆ L × L the transition relation and Γ : L 7→ E a
labeling function that assigns an event from the set of events E to every location
in L.
We additionally define the set Paths(F) as the set of sequences of the form
π = ℓ0, ℓ1, . . . , ℓn where ℓ0 ∈ L0, ℓ1, . . . , ℓn ∈ L and ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} :
(ℓi, locationi+1) ∈ δ.
An extended event flow graph (EEFG) thus encodes a set of event sequences
that are considered possible in an application. That is, that the user interactions
represented by the event sequence can be observed during the execution of the
application.
Definition 2 (Possible Event Sequence). Let Paths(F) be the set of all
paths in the extended event flow graph F = 〈L,L0, δ, Γ 〉. A sequence of events
σ = e0, e1, . . . , en is called a possible event sequence if and only if there exists
a path π = ℓ0, ℓ1, . . . , ℓn ∈ Paths(F) such that ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n} : Γ (ℓi) = ei.
For brevity, we denote all possible event sequences for a given EEFG F with the
set Possible(F).
Verification of GUI Applications As usual, we define the states of an ap-
plication as pairs s = 〈ℓ, ν〉 where ℓ is the value of the program counter (the
program location) and ν is a valuation function that assigns values to the pro-
gram’s variables in their corresponding domains. There is a special state denoted
by sˆ0 = 〈ℓˆ0, νˆ0〉 that is the state corresponding to the application’s entry point
and the initial variable valuation.
An application trace τ = s0, s1, . . . is a sequence of states where s0 = sˆ0 and
every si = 〈ℓi, νi〉, i > 1 is the effect of executing the instruction at location ℓi−1
under valuation νi−1. We assume the usual operational semantics of program
instructions.
Some intermediate states si in a trace correspond to the entry points of event
handlers. Event handlers are program functions that are executed whenever an
interaction with the graphical interface (an event) is triggered. We define the
handler map function H : E 7→ Id where E is the set of events of the graphical
interface and Id the set of locations that correspond to the entry points of the
functions of the application.
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we consider only events whose
handlers change the program state without considering user inputs such as, e.g.,
scroll bars or text boxes. Those events that read user inputs can be replaced by
a family of events where there is one for every possible input value. With that
consideration we can construct the trace that corresponds to an event sequence.
Definition 3 (Traces from event sequences). Let σ = e0, e1, . . . , en be an
event sequence, the corresponding trace is
τσ = sˆ0, sinit1 , . . . , se0 = 〈H(e0), ν〉, s0,1, . . . , se1 = 〈H(e1), ν〉, s1,1, . . .
where the states sinit1 are part of the initialization sequence of the application,
states sei are the states at the entry point of the handler of event i and the states
si,j are the states resulting from executing instruction j− 1 of the event handler
H(ei).
In our setting, assertions are special instructions of the form assert(expr)
that have no effect on valuations and simply update the program counter to
the following instruction. Arguments to assertions are boolean formulas over the
application variables. A state s = 〈ℓ, ν〉 satisfies the assertion a at location ℓa
if and only if ℓ = ℓa and the interpretation of expr under valuation ν is true
(denoted s |= a). We also introduce Assert(AP) to denote the set of assertions
in the code of application AP .
An event sequence σ is called correct if and only if every state si in τσ satisfies
all assertions in the application’s code.
A GUI application, due to the restrictions imposed by its graphical interface,
defines a set of event sequences that can be executed. We denote the set of exe-
cutable event sequences of an application AP with Exec(AP). We thus redefine
the notion of correctness.
Definition 4 (Application Correctness). A GUI application AP is consid-
ered correct with respect to an EEFG F if and only if all possible event sequences
of the event flow graph that are executable, are correct. I.e.,
∀σ ∈ Possible(F) ∩ Exec(AP) : ∀a ∈ Assert(AP) : σ |= a
We thus aim to provide a guarantee of correctness with respect to an EEFG by
applying the algorithm steps described in detail in the following sections.
3.1 Extracting Event Handlers
Each event in a GUI (e.g., a click on a button OK) is encoded as an event handler
(e.g., OnClickOK ). The step Event Handler Extraction mixes aspects of black-
box and white-box approaches in order to extract the GUI’s event handlers. First,
as in a black-box approach, we execute the GUI application and enumerate the
GUI’s widgets (e.g., windows, buttons, and text fields). Then, leaving a pure
black-box approach, we apply Reflection2 in order to obtain the Java object
corresponding to each widget (e.g., JButton. We ask the Java object to invoke
the method getActionListeners. The method invocation returns the widget’s
event handlers (which are called action listeners in Java). In order to have a
unique identifier for the event, we use the widget ID of the GUI application.
If the Java object does not provide the method getActionListeners, there
exists no registered event handler to this widget. In this case, we simply discard
the handler event for this event. However, in the program construction the is-
followed-by relation between events is considered.
Discussion We use a dynamic approach to extract the event handlers. In prin-
ciple it would be possible to extract these event handlers via a static approach by
analyzing the source code. However, since GUI code is written in so many ways,
looking for ActionListeners did not suffice as the event handlers might also be
registered using callbacks, virtual function calls, or even external resource files.
3.2 Program Transformation
In order to encode the testing problem as a verification task, we construct a
Boogie [3] program that incorporates the information of an EFG to simulate the
message loop of the underlying GUI toolkit.
Given an EEFG F = 〈L,L0, δ, Γ 〉, the program PF is constructed by first
inlining all initialization functions to make sure the application’s variables have
2 http://java.sun.com/developer/technicalArticles/ALT/Reflection/
their initial values set correctly before simulating the message loop of the GUI
toolkit. Subsequently, entry and exit labels for the message loop are added to
the program. For each location ℓ in the EFG, the corresponding event handler
H(Γ (ℓ)) is inlined. At the end of the block, a non deterministic goto statement is
added. The target labels of the goto statement are the labels of the locations in
the set {ℓi | (ℓ, ℓi) ∈ δ}∪{EFG Exit}. The jump to the exit label is necessary to
simulate event sequences of finite length in the case of a cyclic EFG. Assertions
in the application code are translated as assertions in PF .
To better illustrate the program transformation, the control flow graph of the
program generated for the example in Section 2 is shown in Figure 5, a simplified
version of the source code is shown in Figure 3. Note the similarity of the control
flow graph of the generated program and the original EFG (see Figure 2).
init1
. . .
initn
EFG Start
e1
e3
e2
e4 EFG Exit
Fig. 5. Control flow graph of the program generated for the example of Section 2. The
nodes correspond to the inlined control flow graphs of the initialization functions and
the event handlers.
Theorem 1. Let F be an EEFG and Traces(PF ) be the set of traces feasible
in the program PF . For every possible event sequence in F , the corresponding
application trace is feasible in the program PF . I.e.,
∀σ ∈ Possible(F) : τσ ∈ Traces(PF)
Proof. (sketch) For an arbitrary sequence σ = e0, e1, . . . , en ∈ Possible(F), use
Definition 3 to produce the corresponding trace τσ = s0, s1, . . . , sm. By the con-
struction of PF , define a mapping from states of PF to states in the application.
Also map instruction labels in the application correspond to instruction labels
in PF .
Assuming s0 = sˆ0, every subsequent application state is justified by an in-
struction in the application, show by the construction of PF that the mapped
program state is justified by the corresponding instruction in PF . Split into cases
for the initialization phase and the execution of event handlers.
Corollary 1. If a trace t in Traces(PF) violates an assertion a (denoted t |= a,
the corresponding event sequence calculated using the mappings from the previous
proof and the inverse of Definition 3 is not correct.
In order to solve our problem of interest (see Definition 4), we apply static
analysis to determine whether a trace that violates an assertion exists. By Corol-
lary 1, the result of the analysis solves the problem
∀σ ∈ Possible(F) : ∀a ∈ Assert(AP) : σ |= a
If a violating event sequence is found, it only remains to check whether it is
executable.
Implementation We implemented our translation approach for GUI applica-
tions written in Java, we integrate the generation of models as an option in
Joogie [2], which translates Java bytecode into Boogie. Our implemented trans-
lation is available for download at joogie.org.
3.3 Static Analysis
In the following we will explain how static analysis processes the produced Boogie
program to verify its safety wrt. assertions or to retrieve an event sequence σI .
For our purposes we need a tool that can handle complex looping structures in
programs well. In the case that the Boogie program has a feasible error trace, the
tool should return the shortest trace that leads to the error, thus ensuring that
the biggest possible trace sets are excluded from the EFG in every refinement
step.
Additionally, the counterexample must be complete in the sense that it must
document the error trace beginning from the initial location of the Boogie pro-
gram to the failing assertion. We use the model checker Kojak (a loose homo-
phone of “codecheck”) which is based on Ultimate [13]. Kojak uses a splitting
algorithm with large block encoding(LBE) [6]. This combination has proven it-
self to be very efficient on programs with complex looping structures in program
code.Kojak uses a breadth first search on the program. Therefore it always finds
the shortest failing trace in the program. The interpolating splitting algorithm
does not guess overapproximations of loops. It rather constructs an invariant for
each loop. The invariant is constructed by splitting the loop using interpolation.
A possible counterexample is encoded in a FOL formula and passed over to the
interpolating theorem prover SMTInterpol [8]. If the formula is unsatisfiable the
model checker obtains Craig interpolants for each node on the spurious coun-
terexample and splits each node by partitioning its state space. On loops the
splitting can be considered as an unwinding. Hence, due to the splitting, the
counterexample is always complete in our sense and the corresponding trace is
easy to comprehend from initial location to error location. As such Kojak full-
fills all our requirements.
From Error Trace to Event Sequence. The model checker Kojak constructs the
control flow graph(CFG) of the Boogie program. As a preprocessing step the
entire program is transformed into a simple goto-program. This eases the map-
ping of control locations in the code to the CFG. Each label becomes a node in
the CFG. All other statements are encoded as transitions between those nodes.
There exist 3 possible outcomes, (1) Safe, (2) Unsafe, and (3) Unknown
(Figure 6). The result types (1) and (3) stop the computation and the overall
(1) Safe Kojak has proved that the specified assertion is not violated in the
program. Hence, there is no error trace to derive an event sequence
from.
(2) Unsafe Kojak has found a counterexample and its corresponding error trace.
Kojak will derive the event sequence σI from the error trace and report
that the assertion has been violated. The event sequence is returned as
the witness of the error.
(3) Unknown Kojak is neither able to verify the program nor to find a feasible coun-
terexample. This can be caused e.g. by an unknown result from the
theorem prover or a timeout etc.
Fig. 6. Result types of the model checker Kojak and the according returned informa-
tion to the Replayer.
algorithm. If the result is Unsafe, the event sequence σI must be derived from
the error trace. The error trace is an alternating sequence of nodes and transi-
tions. According to our prior explanation, each node corresponds to a label in
the Boogie program. Specially marked labels of the Boogie program correspond
to event handlers. Hence, we can easily derive the event sequence σ by map-
ping each marked label on the error trace back to its original event. This event
sequence is handed over to the Replayer.
3.4 Replaying an Event Sequence
The replayer takes as input a sequence of events and embeds it into a GUI test
case. A GUI test case consists of four components: (1) a precondition that must
hold before executing an event sequence; (2) the event sequence to be executed;
(3) possible input-data to the GUI; and (4) a postcondition that must hold
after executing the event sequence. The step Replayer ensures the precondition,
executes the event sequence on the GUI application, inserts input data where
necessary, and checks if the postcondition holds. For (1), as a precondition we
define that all user settings of an AUT have to be deleted before executing the
event sequence. For (3), we generate random data, i.e., random strings for text
boxes. The computation of suitable input values (see [14]) for widgets represents
an orthogonal problem and is not in the scope of this paper. For (4), we use an
executability monitor as an oracle, that is, the GUI test case is marked as passed
if the event sequence is executable on the GUI application. The GUI test case is
marked as failed if the event sequence is not executable on the GUI application.
Furthermore, the replayer recognizes which event in the event sequence is not
executable anymore. Then, the replayer stops the execution and extracts the
shortest non-executable prefix of the event sequence. The replayer forwards the
prefix (a sequence of events) to the refinement procedure, which removes the
prefix from the used EFG.
3.5 EFG Refinement
An extended event flow graph can be seen as a finite representation of the regular
language L over the alphabet of events E that contains possible event sequences
of the program being analyzed (see Definition 2). We transform the extended
event flow graph F = 〈L,L0, δ, Γ 〉 into a non-deterministic finite automaton
(NFA) AF = 〈Σ,Q, q0, F,∆〉 that accepts the regular language L where:
– The input alphabet is the set of events. I.e., Σ = E
– For every location ℓ in F there is a state in the NFA. I.e.,
Q = {qℓ | ℓ ∈ L}
– An initial state q0 is introduced.
– All states except for the initial state are accepting states, F = Q \ q0
– The transition relation ∆ ⊆ Q×Σ ×Q is built from the transition relation
of F . Every edge in δ has a corresponding entry in the transition relation of
AF . The successor event of the event flow relation is used as input symbol
for the edge. Additionally, to account for multiple initial locations, an edge
is introduced between the initial state and the states corresponding to those
locations. I.e.,
∆ = {(qℓ1 , e2, qℓ2) | (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ δ ∧ Γ (ℓ2) = e2}
∪ {(q0, ei, qℓi) | ℓi ∈ L0 ∧ Γ (ℓi) = ei}
Lemma 1. The language L accepted by AF is exactly Possible(F) .
Proof. (sketch) Prove that any event sequence σ = e1, e2, . . . , en ∈ Possible(F)
is accepted by AF . Apply induction over the prefixes of σ and the description
of the construction of AF given F .
A sequence of events σI = e1, e2, . . . , en returned as non-executable prefix of
a violating sequence, is a word accepted by AF (see Section 3.2). If σI is a non-
executable sequence, we exclude from L the regular language I of all sequences
prefixed with σI , i.e., sequences of the form σ.Σ
∗.
For that purpose, we construct an automaton AI that accepts exactly those
sequences. By using the complement and intersection operations on finite au-
tomata, we obtain a new automaton AF
# = AF ∩ I¯ that accepts exactly the
language L# = L \ I. The new automaton AF
# = 〈Σ,Q#, q#0 , F
#, ∆#〉 can be
transformed back into an EEFG F# = 〈L#, L#0 , δ
#, Γ#〉# as follows:
– There is a location for each state except for the initial state.
I.e., L# = {ℓq | q ∈ Q
# \ q#0 }
– Every location is labeled with the input event of its incoming edges.3 I.e.,
Γ#(ℓ) = e where e is the input event of all incoming edges of ℓ, (qi, e, qℓ) ∈
∆#.
– The initial locations are those connected to the initial state.
I.e., L#0 = {ℓq | (q
#
0 , e, qℓ) ∈ ∆
#}
– The transition relation is reconstructed from the transition relation of AF
#:
δ# = {(ℓ1, ℓ2) | (qℓ1 , e, qℓ2) ∈ ∆
# ∧ qℓ1 6= q
#
0 }
Lemma 2. Possible(F#) is exactly the language L# accepted by AF
#.
Proof. (sketch) Analogous to Lemma 1. Prove that any sequence σ ∈ Possible(F)
is accepted by AF
# by induction on the prefixes of σ and the construction of
F#.
Having defined a translation of event flow graphs to and from NFA enables us
to use the method to provide the refinement step of our algorithm (see line 9,
Algorithm 1).
Theorem 2. The possible event sequences of the refined EEFG Possible(F#)
are the event sequences of the original EEFG without all sequences that start
with σI . I.e., Possible(F
#) = Possible(F#) \ I.
Proof. (sketch) Use the definition of AF
# together with lemmata 1 and 2 to
show:
∀σ ∈ I : σ ∈ Possible(F) ∧ σ 6∈ Possible(F#)
The refined event flow graph can thus be used for the subsequent iteration of
our verification algorithm.
4 Evaluation
We apply our prototype implementation of the verification algorithm presented
to some samples of the benchmark set UNL.Toy.2010 from the COMET bench-
mark repository4. We modified each benchmark by adding a variable x and
assertions to the source code to specify the reachability of some value, analogous
to our motivating example. For each sample we added an assertion that is never
violated, and one where an executable event sequence leads to a violation.
The results of our experiments are summarized in Table 1. We report the
number of events; the injected assertion; the time needed for the static analysis;
the number of calls to the theorem prover; the number of refinement iterations
(that is, the number of sequences that were replayed by our approach); the
number of sequences of a pure black-box approach; and the final result of the
benchmark.
3 By construction, it is guaranteed that all incoming edges to a location are labeled
with the same event.
4 Available at comet.unl.edu
In the case of an UNSAFE result of the static analysis, we compare the number
of event sequences tested by our approach (the number of iterations) with the
number of event sequences in a pure black-box approach that would be needed
to guarantee correctness of the applications, that is, the detection of a violated
assertion. Note, that in the case of a SAFE result of the static analysis, a pure
black-box approach cannot guarantee the correctness of the application. Thus,
we express the number of event sequences with ∞.
Benchmark Events Assertion Time(secs) TP Calls Iterations Sequences Result
repair-2-cons 3 x!=8 1,802 267 2 ∞ SAFE
x!=9 0,216 33 1 9 UNSAFE
repair-2-excl 3 x!=3 14,961 1482 4 ∞ SAFE
x!=4 0,066 33 1 9 UNSAFE
repair-3-cons 4 x!=13 0,028 25 1 ∞ SAFE
x!=35 1,019 119 1 16 UNSAFE
repair-3-excl 5 x!=13 0,021 36 1 ∞ SAFE
x!=25 0,505 116 1 25 UNSAFE
repair-cmpd 5 x!=17 0,009 36 1 ∞ SAFE
x!=55 1,56 352 1 25 UNSAFE
Table 1. Experimental results.
5 Related Work
An approach which comes closest to our work is [19,20] which incorporates plan-
ning from the domain of artificial intelligence to generate test cases for GUI
applications. The input to the planning system is a set of operators (namely, the
event handlers), an initial state, and a goal state of the application. The plan-
ning system outputs a sequence of operators that lead from the initial state to
the goal state. However, in this approach a test engineer has to manually define
the preconditions and effects of each operator. Our approach extends this idea
as follows: First, we propose an automatic translation of the operators of a GUI
application into a Boogie program. Second, the static analysis of our approach
can be replaced by other techniques. Third, our approach replays an event se-
quence in a black-box fashion on the GUI application. Fourth, an event sequence
which is not executable on the GUI is used to refine the model which is then
again used to translate the GUI application.
The work in [5] presents a general approach to specify user interactions in
GUI applications from a design perspective. This technique allows the analysis
of user interactions using model checking, and the synthesis of user interactions
to executable GUI applications. Since the work in [5] presents a high-level ap-
proach, it obviates the efforts of extracting models, e.g., from the source code
of an existing application. In our case, we focus on supporting a test engineer
which usually deals with executable GUI applications instead of abstract mod-
els. Hence, the translation of an existing application into a verifiable program
presents one of the main technical contribution of this paper. In particular, our
approach allows the analysis of an executable GUI application, e.g., even in the
phase of release-to-manufacturing within a software release life cycle.
An approach which identifies useful abstractions of existing GUI applica-
tions is presented in [11]. Those abstractions are based on structural features of
GUI applications, e.g., the enabledness of a button (enabled or disabled) using
a boolean value, or the current value of slider control using an integer value.
First, the abstractions are inferred manually from a GUI application. Then, the
abstractions are used to build a model which is checked by SMV [9]. In order to
overcome the manual identification abstractions, the work in [12] focuses on the
automatic analysis of interaction orderings with model checking. In the work [12]
the model is inferred via analyzing the code statically. The static analysis is tai-
lored to a specific GUI toolkit, namely Java Swing. Our approach uses a dynamic
approach: a model (the EFG) is created during the execution of the GUI appli-
cation. Furthermore, our approach introduces a refinement loop which allows to
improve the initial model by replaying event sequences obtained from the step
static analysis. Since GUI code is written in many ways, a static analysis tech-
nique must be tailored to comprehend the behavior of each GUI toolkit. The use
of a black-box model is justified by the reasonable trade-off between applicability
and precision of a black-box model. Furthermore, the EFG is a black-box model
which works independently from a currently used GUI toolkit.
The work in [1] (with shared co-authors) presents a lightweight static anal-
ysis, which generates all event sequences that are at the same time executable
and justifiably relevant. First, the approach infers a model which expresses de-
pendencies of events of the GUI application. Second, event sequences of bounded
length are generated from this dependency model. Third, an event flow graph
is incorporated in order to convert event sequences from the dependency model
into executable event sequences. This paper represents a consistent further de-
velopment: it uses an advanced static analysis which is able to reason about
properties of a GUI application, instead of generating all event sequences that
might violate a specific property.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a method that can give a guarantee of the
absence of faults, i.e., the correctness of all test cases of the black-box model of
a GUI application. We have shown that the black-model allows us to circumvent
the static analysis of the GUI tool kit, namely by constructing a program which
is amenable to static analysis. We have implemented our approach and we have
presented preliminary experiments which indicate its practical potential. The
technical contribution of the paper is to make things work. This includes the
construction of the program from a given EFG as input to a static analysis-
based verification procedure and the program refinement procedure.
The main contribution of the paper is perhaps a conceptual one: the realiza-
tion that formal, static analysis-based verification methods can have an interest-
ing potential for GUI applications, namely as a supplement to GUI testing. The
crux is to take the perspective of the GUI tester who, after having constructed
the black-box model of the GUI application, is faced with what can be phrased
as a verification problem.
In the future, we would like to explore efficient abstractions to support events
with user inputs. In our implementation, an enhanced bytecode translation could
increase the efficiency of static analysis by using a memory model optimized for
the verification of GUI applications.
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